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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE Q:F UTAH

srrArrE. OF

UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case
No. 9562

-vs.GEORGE L. TILLMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESP'ONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE
The appellant, George L. Tillman, also known as
Spike Jones, was convicted of grand larceny (78-36-1
through 4, Utah Code Annotated 1953) and second degree burglary (76-9-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953) in
Third Judicial District Court and sentenced on each crime
with the sentences directed, to run concurrently. Appellant contends that he may not be sentenced on both
charges.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court, upon conviction of defendant of
grand larceny and second degree burglary, sentenced defendant upon each crime, sentences to run concurrently.
No further action was taken subsequent to this action
except the instant appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have so much of the sentence
as applies to the crime of grand larceny vacated. The
respondent, State of Utah, contends the court should
affirm, and deny the relief sought.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent adopts the facts as set out in the appellant's brief as being essentially correct. The only issue
raised on appeal is whether the crime of grand larceny
and second degree burglary may be separately punished
by individual sentences where the two crimes arise out
of the same total transaction.

STATEMENT OF POINT

I.
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED ON BOTH THE GRAND LARCENY
AND SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY
COUNTS.
..-.-·
PoiNT

2
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ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I.

THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED ON BOTH THE GRAND LARCENY
AND SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY
COUNTS.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in
sentencing him for both larceny and burglary where
the burglary and larceny arose from the same total
transaction.
The information under which the appellant was tried
lists two counts : Count One being for the crime of burglary, second degree, and Count Two for grand larceny,
both crimes being charged as having occurred at the same
time and place (R. 8). The facts show that the burglary
preceded the larceny in that appellant, being an accomplice to the actual burglary and larceny, stood by in' a
truck, while his co-principals first entered the building
and then removed property therefrom.
At the outset, it is noted that 77-21-31, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, provides:
''The information or indictment must charge but
one offense, but the same offense may be set forth
in different forms under different counts ; and
when the offense may be committed by the use of
different means, the means may be alleged in the
alternative in the same count; provided, * * * that
an information or indictment for burglary may
contain a count for housebreaking and one for larceny, and an information or indictment for housebreaking may contain a count for larceny; * * * ''
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Section 77-21-32, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is to be
read with the above cited provision and states:
''The defendant or defendants, or any of them,
may be convicted of any offense charged in any
of the counts joined as prescribed in the next preceding section; provided, that no person shall be
convicted of more than one crime upon the same
facts constituting such crime.''
It appears, therefore, that if a person is tried upon
joint counts, he may not be convicted of more than one
crime if the same facts constitute the different crimes.
The appellant, in contending the court should not
affirm the sentence on the larceny count, relies upon
76-1-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The key phrase of
this statute which prohibits multiple punishments for the
same act, is the wording which states : ''An act or omission which is punishable in different ways * * *. '' Sections
77-21-32, and 76-1-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, should
be construed in conjunction with each other, since it would
be an absurdity to allow a conviction but provide that an
accused could not be sentenced upon the conviction. Since
both provisions are related to the same general subject
matter, they should be construed consistently or in pari
materia. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed.,
Sec. 5202.
It is submitted that the construction of the above
statutes is consistent with the sentencing of an accused
on both the count of larceny and burglary arising from
the same total transaction. Generally, separate sentences
may be imposed on each count of an indictment where
4
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different offenses are charged. Thus, as is noted in 24
C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1567, p. 37:
''As a general rule, where accused enters a plea of
guilty or is convicted by a general verdict or
otherwise on several counts of an indictment
charging separate and distinct offenses although
of the same character, he may be subjected to
separate punishments * * *.''
To the same effect is that statement in 15 Am. Jur.,
Criminal Law, Sec. 451, where it is said:
"Unless otherwise provided by a statute, a defendant who pleads guilty or is convicted under
an indictment charging two distinct offenses may
be punished for both.''
See also 9 Am. Jur., Burglary, Sec. 83, 31 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 727.
In the instant case, there is no question but that
larceny and burglary are distinct and separate offenses.
The elements of one are not the same as the elements of
the other. The same facts nor the same acts or omissions
do not give rise to both crimes. Larceny takes over where
burglary leaves off. Section 76-1-23, U. C. A. 1953, requires that the same act or omission be punishable in
the same way; but the acts constituting burglary will
not justify a conviction for larceny, and vice versa.
The appellant has cited several early federal cases to
the effect that a sentence cannot be imposed for both
burglary and larceny where they arise from the same
totality of circumstance. It is noted that these cases pre-
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ceded the decision in Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632
(1915), where the United States Supreme Court said:
''But the test is not whether the criminal intent
is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts ha.ve been committed with the requisite criminal intent and are
such as made punishable by act of Congress.''
(Emphasis added)
The court there upheld the sentencing of the accused for
both the breaking and entering of a post office and larceny
therefrom.
The subsequent federal cases cited by appellant are
not concerned with the specific issue now before the court,
nor as here where we have two separate statutes. The
cases cited by the appellant for the most part involve violations of a single statute, making several things criminal. Even so, the rule set down in Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U. S. 296 (1932), is still applicable to cases
like that of the instant situation. 1 In the Blockburger
case, the court set the test for multiplicity of sentence as
follows:
"The applicable rule is that where the same act
or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not.''
There is, therefore, no inconsistency between the
federal position and the position advocated by the State
1See Gore v. United States, 35 7 U. S. 386 (1958) and Harris v. United
States, 359 U. S. 19 (1959), where the United States Supreme Court adhered
to the Blockburger rule.
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and applied by the trial court, since burglary and larceny require the proof of separate elements.
It is submitted that the trial court acted properly
and in direct accord with the previous decisions of this
Court. In fVilkinson v. Harr,is, 109 U. 76, 163 P. 2d 1023
(1945), the accused sought release on habeas corpus
because he had been charged in one information with
both burglary and larceny, and sentenced on both counts.
The court denied the writ, holding that since he had not
completed the sentence on either count, his application
was premature. A little over a year later, the same contention as is raised in the instant case and was sought
to be raised in the Wilkinson case was before the Utah
Supreme Court. In Rogerson v. Harris, 111 Utah 330,
178 P. 2d 397 (1947), a writ of habeas corpus was sought
by petitioner on the grounds that he was improperly convicted of larceny and third degree burglary, and sentenced to consecutive sentences on both counts; and that
he had served his sentence for burglary, he should be
freed. The court rejected the contention. It noted that
the statute, that is now 77-21-31, U. C. A. 1953, allows
joinder of the offenses in the information and that what
is now 77-21-32, U. C. A. 1953, prohibits conviction if
the crimes are based upon the same facts. The court
stated:

'' * '" * The clear meaning of Section 105-21-32
[77-21-32, U. C. A. 1953] is that a defendant may
be found guilty of more than one offense charged
in the same information unless the same facts constitute both or all the crimes of which he is
charged.
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"Do the same facts in this case constitute the
crimes of burglary in the third degree and grand
larceny?
''Burglary in the third degree is defined as : 'Every person who, in the daytime, enters any dwelling house * * * or other building, * * * with intent
to steal or to commit any felony whatever therein,
is guilty of burglary in the third degree.' Section
103-9-5, U. C. A. 1943.
"Larceny is defined as: 'Larceny is the felonious
stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away
the personal property of another.' Section 10336-1, U. C. A. 1943.
''The crime of burglary was perpetrated by the
plaintiff's entering the garage with intent to steal.
Had he been interrupted and prevented from taking the car, or, after entering, had he changed his
mind and decided not to take the automobile he
still would have committed the crime of burglary.
"Larceny requires no 'entering.' The crime is
accomplished merely by taking the personal property of another with intent to steal.
''In this case burglary and larceny arose out of
the same total transaction but the proof of the burglary stopped when the proof of the larceny started. Entirely different facts constitute the different
crimes of which the plaintiff was found guilty.
The same facts therefore do not constitute the two
crimes joined but different facts constitute different crimes. Conviction of the two crimes were
therefore not prohibited by Section 105-21-32,
U. C. A.1943." (178 P. 2d at 399.)
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rrhe court also noted that the sentences on the crimes,
which were consecutive and for both larceny and burglary, were proper. The court said:
''The plaintiff was legally charged with burglary
and grand larceny. The convictions and sentences
for the two crimes were regular. He is being detained in the state prison by virtue of those sentences." (Emphasis added)
Although the court did not refer to 76-1-23, U. C. A.
1953, it did decide that the crimes of burglary and larceny are not patterned on the same facts and, hence,
not the same act or omission, and that separate sentences for each are proper. Thus, the Harris case, it is
submitted, is dispositive of the instant appeal.
The position of the Utah court appears in accord
with the greater majority of cases from other jurisdictions as well. In Willia.ms v. State, 109 A. 2d 89 (Md.
1954), the :Maryland Court of Appeals said:
''In Eyer v. Warden, 197 Md. 690, 80 A. 2d 19,
Judge Delaplaine said for the Court: 'Consecutive
sentences, if certain and definite, are valid, where
the accused is convicted of separate and distinct
crimes charged in different indictments or in different counts of the same indictmen.t.' (Emphasis
supplied) We have held that a count of breaking
and entering and a count of larceny may be joined
in the same indictment. Debinski v. State, 194 Md.
355, 71 A. 2d 460; Bowser v. State, supra. The
finding of the jury as to guilt on both the first and
second counts was a finding that separate crimes
had been committed. This trial court could, therefore, in its discretion impose separate punishments, within statutory limits.''
9
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Other decisions from the same state appear to support
the rule. Johnson v. State, 164 A. 2d 917 (Md. 1961);
Young v. State, 151 A. 2d 140 (Md. 1959).
In State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P. 2d 187 (1960),
the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the same argument
as is now urged by appellant and did so while considering the effect of A. R. S., Sec. 13-1641, which is th same
as 76-1-23, U. C. A. 1953. The court said:
"The above statute covers a situation where the
same act is punishable in different ways under
different sections of the law. Under such a situation, he can be punished for only one offense. Burglary and theft are two separate and distinct acts.
To constitute burglary, it is not necessary that
theft be committed.''
To the same effect are Wya.tt v. Alvis, 136 N. E. 2d 726
(Ohio App. 1957); State v. Trunzo, 137 N. E. 2d 511
(Ohio App. 1957); Kuklich v. Baldi, 150 Pa. Super. 390,
28 A. 2d 496 (1942); State v. Byra, 128 N.J. L. 429, 26 A.
2d 702 (1942) ; People v. M orhous, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 274
(1946); Robinson v. Com1nonwealth, 190 Va. 134, 56 S. E.
2d 367 (1949); Copeland v. Manning, 109 S. E. 2d 361
(S. C. 1959); Sharp v. State,. 61 Neb. 187, 85 N. W. 38;
People v. Guarino, 132 Cal. App. 2d 554, 282 P. 2d 538
(1955); People v. Macias, 161 Cal. App. 2d 594, 326 P.
2d 936 (1958).
Substantial reasons exist for the precedents, since
different values are concerned in each crime (see 100 U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 411 [1952]) ; and where both are involved,
the result is more serious than if just one crime were
10
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present. In Fnitcd States v. Mayo, 26 C. M. R. 627
(1958), pn. denied, 27 C. l\L R. 512, the court rejected
the ''single transaction'' and ''continuous impulse'' tests

as being not applicable to the crimes of housebreaking
and larceny. The court said:

''It is our opinion that none of the rules or tests
enunciated briefly above are, or should be, determinative of the case at hand. It is unthinkable
that a housebreaking should be determined to be
multiplicious with a separate and further offense
committed after the housebreaking has been effected. So to hold would be an invitation to further
criminal offense.''
It is submitted that the contention of the appellant
IS unmeritorious both on the basis of Utah precedent
and upon other authority.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that appellant's argument, having

been laid to rest before by the court, need not now be
interred since the social values sought to be protected
at the time of Rogerson v. Harris are still the social
values of the present day. It is recognized that even if
the appellant's initial premise were sound, the question
of the effect of the sentences upon the collective mind of
the Board of Pardons may not be ripe for judicial investigation; but since the initial position of appellant is not
based upon a correct rationale, that issue need not be met.
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It is submitted that the court should affirm both
sentences.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Deputy Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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